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Introduction
The final third of the twentieth century finds the United States
entering what has been called a "post-industrial phase." This has been
described as a period in which the economy, having moved from preoccupation
with the production process, concentrates more heavily on services,
research, education, and amenities. ) Economic historians point out that
during the past fifty years, Gross National Product in the U.S.A. has
shown a consistent tendency to increase faster than the labor force and
capital goods investment; they attribute this to a special growth ,factor,
new technology. As the weight of the economy shifts from a product base,
innovation of scientific and technological derivation increasingly becomes
the force expected to maintain and to spur prosperity. And, as the old
industrial order wanes, we may reasonably anticipate that, more and more,..
the focus of interest will move from the "hardware" of machines and
merchandise to the "software" of ideas and methods.
The environment provided by the post-industrial era appears to be
highly hospitable to the transplant of "intellectual technology" from the
arena of the military and the vast expanses of outer space to concerns
close to hearth and home. A nation which can aspire to put a man on the
'Associate Research Sociologist, Space Sciences Laboratory, University
of California, Berkeley.
lUaniel Bell, "Notes on the Post-Industrial Society II," The Public
Interest, No. 7, Spring, 1967, P. 102.
2moon was challenged by its President 2 to direct its genius to solving
urgent social problems. His words were a repetition of those used by
Edmund G. drown in 1964 when, as Governor of California, he called upon
the aerospace industry to apply systems analytic methods to civil problems.
"We can use the know-how that will get a man to the moon to get Dad to
Work on time." This handy lunar analogy has been used subsequently by
Vice president Humphrey in a number of speeches, Recently he stated that
"the techniques that, are going to put a man on the Moon are going to be
exactly the techniques that we are going to need to clean up our cities;
the management techniques that are involved, the coordination of govern-
ment and business, of scientist and engineer. We're not going, to make
these cities over just by a speech. And we're not going to do it either
just because we have a hundred billion dollars that somebody wants to
put into it. I get on my favorite topic, It takes more than ,just money
to do anything. It requires knowledge, planning; it requires the tech-
nology, the ability to get things done. There is no checkbook answer to
the problems of America. There are some human answers and the systems
analysis approach (his italics) that we have used in our Defense Department;
the systems analysis that we have used in our space and aeronautic program --
that is the approach that the modern city of America is going to need if
it's going to become a livable social institution. So maybe we're
pioneering in space only to save ourselves on Earth. As a matter of fact,
maybe the nation that puts a man on the Moon is a nation that will put
man on his feet first right here on Earth. I think so."3
2 tate of the Union Address by President Lyndon B. Johnson, January,
1968.
3Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, Speech at Smithsonian Institution,
quoted in Aerospace Technology, Vol. 21, No. 24, May 20, 1968, p. 19.
3The inclination to regard systems analysis as perhaps the most valu-
able "spinoff" of the national space endeavor gets enormous support from
a heterogeny of proponents and in the face of a continuing lack of sub-
stantive evidence for its efficacy in the social sphere. Nonetheless,
to systems analysis has been accorded the mission of providing, the vehicle
which will convey scientific and technological advance directly into
current channels for mankind's immediate utility and benefit. The origi-
nal four California studies, a pioneer demonstration of this effort,
accounted for a total investment of a mere $ 400,000 and, for various
political and economic reasons to be reported later in this paper, involved
only aerospace companies. This was a very modest beginning. The appli-
cation of systems approach to a broad range of social. problems has bur-
geoned, as can be ,judged by the number of entries and amount of money
recorded in an inventory prepared in 1967. i4' The list, far from compre-
hensive, included over 100 contracts for non--military systems analyses
completed or in progress. Already, two-thirds of a billion dollars of
public funds have been committed. With the activation of some 75 model-
cities programs under the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Act of
1966,which provides $20 billion annually for urban development, more and
more local administrations are contracting for systems studies on the
assumption that herein lie the guides to "scientific planning." The
active participation of industrial firms, because of their familiarity
with systems management techniques as used in their own business, receives
the strong endorsement and encouragement of General Bernard A. Schriever,
former Commander of the U.S. Air Force Systems Command and now Special
4John S. Gilmore, John J. Ryan, and William S. Gould, Defense Systems
Resources in the Civil Sector: An Evolvin g Approach, An Uncertain Market,
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C., July, 19 7,
Tables C-1 and C-2, pp. 147-155•
hAssistant to the Department of Housing and Urban Development. To the
sound of paeans of praise from such special interest groups as the aero-
space industry and other corporations claiming systems-management prowess,
he is organizing a gigantic consortium of private companies to mount an
attack on the problems besetting our cities. Noteworthy is the fact that
the contracts are no longer the private preserve of the aerospace com-
panies. how diverse and variegated is the array of resources and disci-
plines mobilized can be seen by a brief review of the contenders for
contracts for systems studies of urban and other social problems: aero-
space and aviation firms, computer manufacturers and their subsidiaries,
electronics companies, management consultants, directory publishers,
university-based entrepreneurs, non-profit but highly lucrative "think
tanks," such as Stanford Research Institute, the HAND Corporation, System
Development Corporation, and the Hudson Institute, Inc., to say nothing
of their proliferating satellites, usually founded by ambitious ex-
employees, many of whom are also "graduates" of the Department of Defense.
All are competing energetically to bring what ,journalists enthusiastically
hail as "a powerful new planning tool" 5 to bear on matters concerning the
common weal. Viewed with high hope in the United States, systems analysis
is also regarded as a promising item for export, 6 especially as the
European business community casts an envious eye toward sustained growth
and prosperity in the United States.?
5Lawrenco Lessing, "Systems Engineering Invades the City," Fortwne,
January, 1968, pp.. 155-157 9 21$-221.
6cf. Lockheed International's contract for a transportation system
in the Sudan, Litton Industries' contract with the Greek government for
an economic land use study.
70rganization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Reviews of
National Science Policies -- United States, Paris, 1968.
5Although there is developing a substantial literature on the application
of systems analysis to military matters, 8 its utilization in the civil, or
social, sphere has received plaudits but little critic3i appraisal, The "Cali-
fornia experience" was publicly proclaimed as a successful demonstration of
the feasibility of using space engineering to solve "Incredibly difficult
social problems" even before the reports submitted by the respective contractors
could bo- subjected to scrutiny by the affected state agencies. The Congression-
al Record of October 18, 1965 carried the now-familiar forensic: '",,.why can
not the same specialist who can figure out 	 way to put a man in space figure
out a way to keep him out of ,jail? Why can not the engineers who can move a
rocket to Mars figure out a way to move people through our cities and across
the country without the horrors of modern traffic and the concrete desert of
our highway system? Why can not the scientists who can cleanse instruments
to spend germ-free years in space devise a method to end the present pollution
of air and water here on earth? Why can not highly trained mi)npower, which
can calculate a way to transmit pictures for millions of miles in space, also
show us a way to transmit enough simple information to keep track of our ci-imi-
naffs? The answer is we can -- if we have the wit to apply out- scientific
know-how to the analysis and solution of social problems with the same creativ-
ity we have applied it to space problems.""
Reverently cited as a model worth emulating on a national and even inter-
national scale, the "California experience" deserves critical ao,a 1 ys i s
lest public relations panegyrics and self-protective political shrouds
obscure lessons of wide import and long-lasting value that can be derived
Ile
	
	 8 A overview, with fairly comprehensive references, is to be found in
Defense Management, Stephen Enke, ed., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-
Hall, inc., 1967.r
9 Statement by Senator Gaylord P. Nelson, Congressional Record, Proceedings
and Debates of the 89th Congress, First Session, October 18, 199'5—, No. 194.
therefrom. To that ends we shall report here some of the findings of a
case study based on the four original analyses (waste management, criminal
justice, information, and transportation) and the immediate successor to
them, a study of public welfare. Underlying the research in progress are
such interrelated questions as the following: Does the technical capa-
bility developed in programs of military defense and space exploration
have relevance in the addressing of problems confronting terrestrial
society? To what extent are social, problems amenab',e to solution by
quantitative methods? Can systems analysis be applied with equal efficacy
to such disparate matters as, for example, mass transportation and social
welfare? What inferences can be drawn from the California experience
that will be meaningful as the quantitative techniques of systems analysis,
cost/effectiveness measures, and program budgeting permeate the decision-
making processes at all levels and in most agencies of government?
In order to arrive at definitive answers, it was necessary to examine
the conditions surrounding, and thn assumptions underlying the application
of the systems approach. Of primary interest were the political circum-
stances, which ensured an enthusiastic reception for the "powerful tools
of technology," for they indicated the extent of the "myth-math" syndrome,
the mythical-mathematical magic which gives systems analysis much of its
prestige. This, along with inspiring the original California experiment,
has sustained and nurtured both a proliferation of similar government-
industry contracts and a growing reliance on quantitative techniques,
'	 such as cost/benefit and planning-programming-budgeting, in the conduct
of public affairs. Of equal interest is the conception, implicit in the
approach, of a social system. Viewed in broadest terms as an arrangement
of component parts which interact in certain ways to achieve certain
goals, any "social system," be it a transportation network or social
welfaro, became subject to the same "treatment." Actually, there may be
.
about as much justification for committing society's sundry malfunctioning
systems to the care of a systems analyst whose sole claim to expertise is
technical as to calf, a hydraulic engineer to cure an ailing heart because
his specialty is pumping systems;
Intensive research study of completed and ongoing systems studies
in California and elsewhere suggests that the assumptions underlying the
transfer have yet to be validated. However, if for the sake of serendipity,
one were willing to accept the premises, one still would face the herculean
task of distinguishing the technique of systems analysis froth its self-
justifying, built-in rationalizations, better suited to its own preserva-
tion than to amelioration of a social ill. As will be shown later in the
discussion of the state-of-the-art, the model, intended to simulate
reality, is the artist's own conception of the system. His definition of
the problem, his perceptions of the variables and of its linkages in time,
space, and function with other agencies and institutions of the society
are not only expressed in but defended by his analysis. Faced with the
criticism that the proposed system design is only one biased conception,
the analyst has a ready answer: To encompass all the dimensions of a
social system is recognized as an ideal not to be attained under the
present contract, due to limitations of time and funding. So, he provides
a fanciful description of the total system, as he envisions it, in the
form of a flow-diagram made up of little boxes and many-directioned arrows,
"	 with "input" at one end and "output" at the other. From this display, he,
y
selects one or more portions for "sub-optimization,'" i.e., improvement of
the operation of given components. This escapes the criticism of "piece.-
meal fragmentation" or incrementalism levelled at public officials who,
8like "Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme, rZ0 have sub-optimized all their lives,
through the semantic manipulations that permeate the process of systems
analysis. The technical expert makes a case for more and 'bigger contracts
on the ground that frim his drawing of the total Gestalt, he can now fit
the pieces into the giant puzzle. That social systems are not static in
time and place and that the attention bias caused by optimizing a sub-
portion could seriously perturb the whole system and all its internal and
external relationships are matters left not only untouched but often
unacknowledged in the analysis. If this is due to ignorance on the part
of the expert or a shortcoming of the methodology, then certain corrective
steps are clearly in order. If, on the other hand, as C. West Churchmanli
has suggested, the question here is one of professional moral responsibility,
then the systems analyst is reprehe"si.ble for having ti ed to convey an
impression of having solved the total problem through handling only the
feasible portion. The consequences of this performance may best be
described by recalling Banquo's comments on the witches, 12 "s . .the
instruments of darkness win you with honest trifles, to betray you in
deepest consequence."
Observation and analysis of the California experience and of subse-
quent systems studies in California and elsewhere have substantiated and
rei;.ifurced a number of important insights. Through an .investigation of
the application of these methods, we have learned much about the nature
of the problems generated by our scientific age and about the social and
lOJean Baptiste Moli^re, "Le bourgeois Gentilhomme," Oeuv res , Paris,
Lefevre, 1837.
4.
11C. West Churchman, "Wicked Problems," Guest editorial in Management
Science, Vol. 14, No. 4, December, 1967, pp. B-141-142.
12William Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act I, Scene III.
political environment in which they exist and must be faced. We have been
able to observe at close hand the dynamics of the increasingly important
phenomenon, government by contract, through which the business community
a	 takes on tasks traditionally in the public bailiwick and outside "experts"
are called upon to handle the business of government. As anyone who has
undergone analy€., .:; (whether of psyche or system) can attest, the process
I,* not without strain and stress. And when it is over and, done, despite
all the methodological pretensions to exactitude and precision, there
still is no clear -cut allocation of the costs and benefits, as between
doctor and patient!
The California Studies - Requests for Proposals and Responses
On November lit, 1964, Edmund G. Brown, then Governor of California,
announced the state's intention to ce),a, for bids from the aerospacf;
industry to work out plans in four areas;
it
	 transportation. We will ask the systems engineers to study
ways to provide a complete transportation network within the state,
efficiently coupled into land, sea, and air transportation from out of
state. We will ask them to identify the major patterns of movement of
people, merchandise, materials, and food within the state. We will ask
them to describe the transportation system which the state will need 30
to 50 years from now to provide efficient movement.
"And, finally, we will ask them to tell us how much such a transpor-
Cation system will cost; who should pay for it; who should rvn it.
"Second, we will ask the systems engineers to design new ways to
`	 cope with California's criminally and mentally ill.
"This is a problem with which it 
-*Is becoming increasingly difficult
for California to cope. Our population is growing and so is the population
4P
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of mentally ill. There are flaws in any system that involves institutional
control and we will ask the aerospace teams to suggest ways in which they
fright be corrected. Perhaps an entirely new social structure within a
hospital is desirable. We would like to know whether the cost of care
can be cut and the efficiency of treatment be improved.
"The third problem we will pose to the systems engineers is that of
accurate collection of information on which government and industry can
base decisions for years and even decades ahead.
"We will ask the aerospace engineers to design systems that will
improve our data on diseases and educational requirements. We will ask
them to provide information on special needs of some of our population we
might now be overlooking;
"Finally, waste management. There is a system at present for managing
the wastes discharged into the air, soil, and water of California as a
result of consumption by men and machines of materials which are necessary
to support life or to produce goods. But it is not a system which has
been developed by deliberate design to meet the state's needs."13
Out of about 50 companies which submitted proposals, four were selected
by ad hoc evaluation panels,appointed by the statq to receive $ 1009000
9-month study contracts. They were as follows:
1. The Aerojet-General Corporation -- to assess the suitability of systems
analysis and systems engineering as tools for solving California's
waste management problem, and to define research and development
activities to be undertaken as the first step of an overall program.
In its proposal, the company stressed the need for a major change in
13Edmund G. Brown, Address given to University of California (at Los
Angeles) Extension Symposium Luncheon, Los Angeles, November 14, 1964.
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approach rather than incremental modifications of present procedures
and facilities. Pollution of land, water, and air was to be taken
into account in a total system design. Moreover, attention was to
be given to the effect that the development of superior processes for
water treatment would exert on the state's economy, especially with
respect to attracting water-dependent industries.
?. Space-General Corporation, a subsidiary of Aerojet-General Corporation --
to investigate the feasibility of applying systems engineering tech-
niques to -the development of programs for prevention and control of
delinquency and crime. It may be noted that the focus of the study
to be performed. is W fferent from the one set forth in the Request
for Proposal. The contractor and its subcontractor, Serendipity
Associates, decided that the earlier scope had been too broad and that
their study design was more consistent with the realities of time and
money allocated. Other companies responded to the Request; for Proposal
as issued by the state.
3. The Lockheed Missiles & Space Company -- to design a statewide infor-
mation service and develop a plan for its implementation. The proposal
included as requirements for such a system comparative data on occupa-
tional trends and prospects, automatic surveillance of the incidence
of disease and various handicaps, correlation of employment opportuni-
ties with educational requirements, and improved methods for keeping
track of discharged mental patients and ex-convicts,
4. North American Aviation, Inc. -- a work program indicating the content
and specifications for a systems approach to solving basic transporta-
tion problems. In this contract, the state had requested only the
design of a study. The winning proposal emphasized the urgency of
thorough analysis of all factors affecting transportation, recommended
12
careful and completely integrated planning lest "a catastrophic jumble"
result, and hinted of innovation to come: ". . . rockets taking;
Californians to New York in minutes, tube trains with San Francisco-
to-Los Angeles times similar to today's gets, individual air-cars from
house to office, hands-off control of all vehicles on freeways, auto-
mated pipeline movement of produce from farm to hone in hours, contin-
uous flow of mail from drop box to destination."
i The completed studies i4 became instant leverage for further systems
analysis contracts. Almost immediately, California received nearly
$ 1 million in federal funds for the following:
1. $ 225,000 - systems management analysis of the California Welfare
System (Space-General Corporation).15
2. $ 175,000 - solid waste management study in the area of Fresno,
California (Aerojet-General Corporation).
3. $ 220,000 - land use information in Santa Clara County (TRW Systems,
Inc.).
4. $ 350,000 - study of needs for a system of criminal justice information
(Lockheed Missiles & Space Company).
In formulating requests to the aerospace industry for proposals in
the realm of civil problems, the State of California had no precedent on
which to draw. Previous contracts had called for specific goods and sery--
ices, with explicitly articulated requirements and enforceable quality
standards.- In this situation, the state sought "to draw upon the imagina-
tion of the contractor in approaching the optimal solution to the problem
14Copies of some of the studies were made available through the State
of California's Printing Office, Documents Division, Sacramento, California.
15The case study here reported draws on materials from this contract
in addition to the original four.
13
at hand through an overall analysis of the total program with effective
suboptirrization of the component parts. `,16 How to formulate a request
for proposal that conveys to the prospective contractor the essence of
In	 the problem and the objectives of the system is an art still. to be mastered
by government staff. The tendency is toward over-generality or over-
specificity, and either extreme has its drawbacks. If the phrasing is
general, the contractor fails to perceive the problem's dimensions as
experienced by the professionals close to it; his response is likely to
be couched in vague terms, rendering all but impossible realistic judgment
of his potential capability. It, on the other hand, the terms are set
forth in detail, the contractor is likely to respond in an item-by-item
proposal, which precludes the very imagination and "new look" desired by
the state.
The state's task in choosing the best contractor is complicated by
the fact that proposals for systems analysis of civil problems take the
form of a mixture of jargon and salesmanship. Indeed, it is almost
impossible to distinguish the merchandise from the merchandising, the
evidence supporting the contractor's claim to competence to do the ,job
at hand from his generalized corporate "image." For example, all fifty-
odd proposals submitted in response to the State of California's call
dwelt long on defense and aerospace contracts and subcontracts held, as
though designing and building a rocket's launch system were proof positive
of capability to design a system of criminal justice. Large sections of
the proposalscontained biographical materials on all personnel of the
contractor as well as curricula vitae of those individuals to be assigned
to the project. But, as indicators of the company's ability, these were
16state of California, Department of Finance, Sacramento, California,
"Request for Proposals," November 18, 1964.
l4
frequently irrelevant and generally unreliable. The company, "think tank,"
or management consulting firm might have won an undisputed reputation in
its field; it could truthfully count thousands of advanced degrees among
its employees These facts receive similar emphasis both in the organi-
zation's institutional advertisements and in its proposals. But such
eulogies did not substantiate the claim to "systems capability" as needed
in the social arena. Using this kind of justification, ornithologists
could compete for the same jobs as aerodynamics experts on the basis of
experience with flying objects!
Not only was the type of work to be done different, but also the
conditions: The experts in every instance were accorded a measure of
autonomy in the conduct of the systems study quite unprecedented in their
customary roles as members of strictly programmed components of highly
organized enterprises. This carte blanche, never allowed the professionals
working in the field, permitted a freedom to approach the problems on a
state or regional basis, without regard to existing jurisdictional bound-
aries, and in a timespan that played leap frog into thQ year 2000 with
but scant regard for 1970. The California Integrated Transportation
Study17 held forth the tantalizing prospect of "trains gliding through
tubes at speeds of today's jetliners, possibly far below surface streets
and countryside," "Chips that 'fly' a few feet over the waves at several
hundred miles per hour, only to nestle gently to a dock where they will
exchange hundreds of thousands of pounds of containerized cargo in short
times comparable to today's airplanes." Significantly, however, the
experts, in designing the brave new world for his posterity, failed to
get Pad through the traffic jams or onto a form of transit that would,
17North American Aviation, Inc., Los Angeles, California, California
Integrated Transportation Study, September, 1965, Vol. I, P. 4.
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as California's Governor had asked, get him to work on time!
With respect to the qualifications of the particular persons assigned
by contractors to government projects, there is room for reasonable doubt
as to their superior ability, either regarding engineering tasks or the
public problem at hand. It is likely that the giax;,t corporations do not
assign their most talented scientists and engineers to such contracts.
Perhaps the explanation for a man's availability for redeployment is more
his expendability than his ability; or he may be a relative newcomer,
hired for the stockpile and in need of interim occupation. Here it is
pertinent to note the unanticipated bonus realized from an undergraduate
minor in economics or a chance course in sociology or education. Depend-
ing on the system to be analyzed, an interesting assortment of titles
blossoms among the team members. With the printing of the business cards,
individuals became "Manager of Socio-Economic Systems," or "Educational
Systems Analyst," or "Specialist in Demography," as the case demanded.
The widespread practice of ad hoc title bestowal raises some compelling
questions about (1) the personnel practices in effect in the "hard" systems
work that companies proudly hail as their claim to missions well done;
(2) the possibility that civil systems, which involve so significant an
element of public trust, are being addressed in a cavalier fashion; (3)
the jeopardy into which the systems approach could be placed by Nanki-Poos18
who "tune their supple song" to the "changing humor" of the occasion or
inappropriate experts masquerading as specialists.
In their proposals, most aspiring problem-solvers promise that company
staff will be bolstered by outside specialists as needed and, perhaps,
even present a list of potential consultants. The professional proficiency
18The Wandering Minstrel in The Mikado, by W. S. Gilbert and Sir
Arthur Sullivan.
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o,, such aiathorities is usually unimpeachable, their reputations impeccable.
But the extent to which their services are utilized and their recommenda-
tions heeded are ;Hoot matters. Consultants fall into two main categories
(1) persons drawn from within the contracting organization because of some
special expertise; (2) outside experts hired to advise, monitor, or evalu-
ate the effort. The first group may be-deprived of meaningful participa-
tion because of the pecking order. In the Welfare Study, 19 for example,
a man with a Ph.D. in psychology was bo4rowed from the personnel department
of the contractor's parent company to lend the team its social science
orientation. Since his forte was personality testing and his status obvi-
ously less elevated than that of the chief analyst, he played just about
the same role as the Dormouse at the Hatter's Mad Tea-Party,' The second
group is likely to be captive, in the sense that its contribution, once
bought and paid for, may be put to use or on the shelf, whatever best suits
the pleasure of the analysts. As monitors hired to ensure a worthwhile
and usable product, fellow-analysts from competing companies or "think
tanks" have doubtful worth, in that they demonstrate greater loyalty to
their fraternity than to either their current employer or client. Indeed,
the mobility patterns and deportment of systems analysts generate a "sum
quod eris" situation, i.e., "'another time 'round I could be on the griddle."
Consultant to the government on one project, staff member of the contractor
next, and, later, entrepreneur seeking contracts on his own, the systems
specialist pursues an existence characterized by commensality, whichever
side of the table he happens to be occupying. 20 Sharing the same technical
i90p. cit.
20For an interesting perspective on this point, see Chapter XIII, "The
New Braintrusters" in 11. L. Nieburg, In the Name of Science, Chicago:
Quadrangle Books, 1966.
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approach to the problem as the contractor, he fails to discern the falla-
cious assumptions or neglected variables. Instead, he criticizes innocuous
details, hints that any deficiencies of the %tudy were due to limitations
of (a) funds and (b) for follow--on contracts, which he will be in a posi-
tion either to administer or compete for,
"Conference Participation" is another item included for credit in
the proposal. With the growing interest in the application of systems
analysis to public problems, more and more professional societies, govern-
ment agencies, and, especially, social planning groups, Include at their
conferences special sessions devoted to quantitative techniques and their
potential uses. Almost invariably, the rostrum of speakers includes
representatives from the "industry," whether it be an aerospace firm, a
"think-tanker," or an entrepreneurial management consultant. Such pres-
entations are listed as evidence of superior competence. Since, however,
most such papers are little more than thinly disguised sales promotions,
designed to convince the particular profession of its need for systems
analysis and of the company's "systems capability," small credit is due
anyone -- the spokesman who delivered the sales talk or the organization
so naive as to invite a fox into its hen house!
So highly developed is the art of responding to requests for proposals
that the preparation of them has become the specialty of some firms.
Under contract, they will compile for the aspiring bidder a very impressive
looking document, replete with overlay maps, flow diagrams, tasks and sub
tasks, and biographical data, on any subject, from a transportation network
in Pakistan to a welfare system in Indiana. The finesse with which com-
pany representatives conduct the ceremony of presenting the proposal to
government officials has been called the "art of the flip chart." Small
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in Pakistan to a welfare system in Indiana. The finesse with which com-
pany representatives conduct the ceremony of presenting the proposal to
government officials has been called the "art of the flip chart." Small
wonder that the bemused client expects a miracle; the result of such an
18
oversell is invariably disappointment. Even if systems analysts had
Rumpelstiltskin to help them, they could not possibly deliver the gold
their client has been led to expect!
Tremendous advantage, far out of proportion to service rendered or
competence demonstrated, is enjoyed by the competing firm which can refer
in its proposals to civil systems contracts previously held. Completed
studies are likely to be cited as though they were proof of quality per-
formance when in point of fact they may have fallen so short of the state's
expectations that only the political milieu in which they were conducted
and the amorphous state-of-the-art ensured their formal acceptance. In
all business matters, fulfilbaent of the written contract discharges the
obligation of the respective parties. This is a relatively simple matter
when tangible products are .involved. Whether ratchets or rockets, if
they meet the set standards of quality and performance, they are accepted.
In the case of systems analysis, the ethics of the marketplace still pre-
vail, The r:t,^ntract is fulfilled when the deadline is met by delivery of
the study. There being as yet no universally accepted set of criteria
for a good analysis, 21 the state cannot refuse payment on the ground of a
poor product. Moreover, in any confrontation over the usefulness of the
study, the contractor is likely to adopt a caveat em for stance and blame
the government agency for having asked the wrong questions, ,failing 'to
clarify its goals, possessing too many bureaucratic roadblocks to allow
for the brave new approach to work its benefits. The fact that these
were the very problems that the "powerful technological tools" were pur-
ported to solve somehow goes by the board unnoticed. And thus, both parties
to the contract are spared the embarrassment of political exposure, a matter
21E. S. Quade, ed., Analysis for Milita Decisions, Chicago'l Rand-
McNally & Co., 1967, p. 149.
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to be discussed later, and able to engage in more and more lucrative con-
tracts, The shrouds of oblivion are merciful to the contractor in that
they may hide a shoddy product and to the public agency for asking too
much and getting too little.
Unless one can accept as an article of faith the idea that systems
analysts are endowed with clairvoyance denied professionals with experi-
ence in the specific fields, it is patently preposterous to ask for a
transportation system to provide "efficient movement" 30 to 50 years from
now, improved "efficacy of treatment" of the menta.1.ly ill, or information
on ""special needs of some of our population we might now be overlooking."22
And it is presumptuous of analysts to rush in with their prefabricated
model into which the problems are molded and operation of which will yield
""efficacy" and "efficiency." Without a theoretical framework in the given
fields and the understanding and judgment acquired through experience,
these terms are totally devoid of meaning.
General Remarks about Systems Analysis
Systems analysis has gained ubiquitous acceptance from county to
Congress as a nostrum for a vast array of social problems even before it
has been satisfactorily defined. Indeed, were it not for the fact that
precision and definition -- of measures, objectives, inputs, outputs,
parameters, and the like -- are two of the prime values attributed to its
methodology, one might plod patiently through the volumes which have been
written about systems analysis and not question that the experts cannot
come up with a satisfactory definition of what it is! One could emulate
Gertrude Stein's "rose is a rose" and suggest that systems analysis is
22Reference is made here to the Requests for Proposal listed in
earlier pages.
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the analysis of systems. This is gust as enlightening and probably some.
what less confusing than the Erallimaufry of terms, hem„ ,	 s, gn, systems
stu , systems engineering, used practically interchungeably to describe
the operation# Et S. Quade, in a RAND paper, 23 explained that systems
analysis eludes definition because "it. is still largely a form of art,'"
in which there are neither fixed rules nor universally accepted. principles.
Aaron Wil.daysky211 made the observation in an authoritative article on the
related subjects of cost/benefit analysis, systems analysis, and program
budgeting, that one should not be surprised at the absence of a definition,
for, he contended, the practice of these arts depends largely on "creativity
daring, and nerve." Notable here because of the "scientific attributes"
imputed to systems analysis is the lack of precision that is usually
associated with scientific methodology.
A brief review of the genealogy and current conception of the systems
approach may serve as useful orientation. This technique, with its adjuncts,
cost/benefit analysis and program budgeting, was described by Charles J.
Hitch in a Royal Society Nuffield Lecture 25 as a direct lineal descendant
of the wartime operational research to which the contributions of P.M.S.
Blackett26 are notable. Specifically, operations research emerged during
World War ZI as a useful method for solving tactical and strategic problems
of a military nature, with optimization of resource allocation its prime
goal. After the war, the business and industrial community and the government
23E. S. Quade, ed.. op,. c., t. , po 153•
24Aaron Wildaysky, "The Political Economy of Efficiency: Cost-Benefit
Analysis, Systems Analysis, and Program Budgeting," Public Administration
Review, Vol. XXVi, No. 4, December, 1966, pp. 292-311.
25Lon,don, England, October 25, 1966.
26p. M. S. Blackett, "Operational Research," The Advancement of Science,
Vol. 5, No. 17, April, 1948, pp. 26-38.
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rapidly adop6ed the approach. Systems analysis, encompassing; a broader
range and longer time perspective, differs only in scope from operations
research and Is likely to be applied to similar problems. To syb.ems
analysis, however, have been attributed: 27 (1) a more distant future environ-
ment, with greater flexibility as to choices; (2) more interdependent
variables; (3) greater uncertainties; and (4) less obvious objectives and
rules of choice. Noteworthy here is item (4), especially in light of
Quade's28 statement cited earlier that there are no fixed rules. Of
greater import, however, is the matter of objectives.
Some authorities maintain that an identifiable and identified objec-
tive is the sine qua non; others regard uncertainty about objectives as
the quintessence of systems analysis. Charles J. Hitch, regarded as so
influential in the development and utilization of this methodology that
it is fat.etiously called. "Hitchcraft," has stated that learning about
objectives is the purpose for an analysis. "Systems analysis at the
national level . . . involves a continuous cycle of defining military
objectives, designing alternative systems to achieve these objectives,
evaluating these alternatives in terms of their effectiveness and cost,
questioning the objectives and other assumptions underlying the analysis,
opening new alternatives and establishing new military objectives, and
so on indefinitely,1129
Objectives, whether proximate or ultimate, implicit or explicit,
defined by client or by analyst, are certainly of crucial importance when
27Albert Wohlstetter, "Scientists, Seere, and Strategy," unpublished
paper, (Council for Atomic Age Studies, Columbia University, 1962), pp.
36-37•
28E. S. Quade, 9g. cit., P
. 153.
29Cha.les J. Hitch, Decision Making for Defense, Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1965, P. 52.
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the system under study is in the realm of public affairs. Here, objectives
play a determining role in the focus of the study, the spatial and temporal
boundaries set for it, the variables regarded as pertinent, how its contiguous
''environments" are viken into account. The concept of a system implies an in-
ternal, interrelated web of components, where there is interaction between
means and ends. And the end controls the means. An organized effort by its
very nature is teleological; it works toward a goal. And what the analyst
perceives as the system's goal molds and weights his conceptions and can pro-
foundly Influence so seemingly quantitative an operation as a cost/effectiveness
measure. ,hose cost becomes whose benefit is not a matter of indisputable ac-
counting but rather an issue fnr interpretation within a given framework, and,
lacking experience in the given field, the analyst makes value judgments based
on his own preconceived notions. In this matter, his role is decisive, for
not only does he make this interpretation, but he can also have biased the
direction of the study through his selection of the alternatives, the variables
included in the model, the data h6 considers as reliable and pertinent, and the
goal he views as desirable.
On this point, Roland N. McKean was among the first to point out the extent
to which value judgments are embedded in the entire process; there is no ulti-
mately correct set of value tags to be attached to the various objectives. 30
one man's price tag on somethir,g like clean air differs from that of another.
An analyst's conception of the purpose of the police department or a public wel-
fare agency will reflect his own social attitudes, and his system design will
reflect it. If, for example, he sees detection of crime as the prime purpose of
the police system, he might, in an era when a comprehensive network of electronic
a
30RoIand N. McKean, 'Cost- Benefit Analysis and its Applicability," (mlueo),
n. i,, p • 7•
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surveillance is a reality, provide "rational" justification for the use
of "hard technology" to achieve his objective. in that case, we might
all have electrodes concealed in our vitamin pills!
Whether one chooses to regard objectives as the cause or the result
of a systems study, one would probably find no reason to quarrel with the
postulate that systems analysis concerns itself with alternatives .involved
in the decision-making process. A spokesman for one of the major "think
tanks" desc;ribad this step in systems analysis as follows: "Examination
of reasonable alternative configurations of system elements that approxi-
mate optimal system performance and the determination of the consequences
of each configuration in terms of feasibility, acceptability, and cost
effectiveness." 31 It is at this point that the analyst develops a model,
a "simplified, stylized representation of the real world that abstracts
the cause-and-effect relationships essential to the question studied." 
31a
The model is a descriptive simulation of reality and is used as a base
for testing hypotheses, especially those comparing; the costs and effective-
ness of various possible courses of action. Although the means of repre-
sentation need not be mathematical, it is usually presented in the form
of a set of equations or a computer program.
The conditions for constructing a complete model of a real system
by means of a mathematical model have been set forth by Robert Boguslaw,
who states that it is important "to determine that the range of situations
in which action can occur has been accurately predicted, and that there
31Statement of Thomas C. Rowan, Vice President and Manager of Advanced
Systems Division, System Development Corporation, Santa Monica, California,
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Welfare, Special Subcommittee
on the Utilization of Scientific Manpower, Scientific Manpower Utilization,
1965-66, Hearings, May 18, 1966 (89th Congress, lst and 2nd Sessions
Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1967, P. 53.
31a E. S. Quade, "Systems Analysis Techniques for Planning-Programming
Budgeting," Santa Monica, California, The RAND Corporation, P-3322, March,
1966 9 P. 7.
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exist analytic or mathematical techniques which can provide solutions to
the models constructed. i32 These conditions can, perhaps, be met in de-
signing missiles and rockets, but not in the realm of social affairs where
the multiplicity of unquantifiable, if not unidentifiable, variables makes
prediction at best a statistical exercise, useful only with certain con-
straints but far from adequate as "a complete model of a real system."
In the absence of clearly specified limits and conditions, the (assumptions
and biases of the analyst are taken as representative of the real system
under study. This often leads to oversimplification, neglect of vital
facets, and inappropriate or unwarranted recommendations and conclusions.
The aerospace industry and others who have been closely associated
with such large-scale enterprises as national defense and space efforts
may claim a conspicuous degree of experience in the dev,^lopment of models
of technically complex systems. It is unfortunate that the word system
can be used in conjunction with nuclear weaponry and, say, elementary
education, for this has led to the assumption and presumption that systems
design, engineering, and analysis as found in the first can be meaningfully
and appropriately applied in the second, that they are somehow alike and
amenable to the same treatment because they are systems. Although the
concept system can be applied to both space hardware and social problems,
tl--e inputs are vastly different, as are the controls and objectives. In
the physical system, such, for example, as a radar network, the components
are tangible, the outputs identifiable. In the social sphere, the crucial
elements often defy definition and are outside the purlieu of statistical
rules; the test of the effectiveness of a social system is to a large
extent a reflection of values and not amenable to mathematical measure.
32Hobert Boguslaw, The New Utopians, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965 2 P. 53.
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Whether, where, and with what modifications a viable transfer of systems
analytic techniques from the arena of military and space to that of public
affairs can be achieved is far from certain. The California experiment
provides insights into the problems and process of such a transfer and,
therefore, serves as a valuable guide as more and more public funds are
being allocated for similar studies,
Reason for the E?Mer .ment
The Economist, in an article entitled "Space Coming Down to Earth,"
referred to the California experiment as an undertaking vested, in many
quarters, with the significance which the Bible ascribes to the mustard
seed! Prophetically viewed as the precursor to huge federally- financed
programs, the aerospace contracts were described as "the prelude to a
national technological assault to engulf mankind in the teeming tomorrow.1133
:Improvement of public administration through the infusion of management
science techniques was certainly one of the reasons for this endeavor,
'but it was by no means the only one. California, with a large share of
the country's defense and aerospace work, has been particularly sensitive
to cutbacks resulting, from the completion of projects, the distribution
of contracts to other states, and Congressional budgeting philosophy.
Retrenchment in space work alone has accounted for a nation-wide loss of
120,000 jobs in the past two years and a continuing drop of about 4,000
every month. 34 And this loss is particularly painful in California, with
its heavy concentration of aerospace and defense work and at a time when
the state's population, 17 million at present and probably 25 million by
A
33"Space Coming Down to Earth," The Economist, March 20, 19659 P. 1275.
34
 John Noble Welford,, "U.S. Space Effort 1s Shrinking after Era of
Growth," New York Times, April 16, 1968.
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1975, grows at a rate twice that of the west of the nation. A reduction
or geographical redistribution of aerospace and defense spending not only
decreases total employment but seriously affects tl iat sector of its labor
force most prized by California, viz. scientific and technical personnel.
Thus, another compelling reason for the California experiment was the
creation of new avenues for the redeployment of the skills of this well-
paid, well-educated elite so as to prevent their flight to greener pas-
tures. Correlated with this reason was the desirability of conversion
and diversification of space- and defense-oriented endeavors.35
Private industry's reasons for involvement come through clearly in
institutional advertisements and in the "Help Wanted" columns. "Where
do we go from here?" asks one firm in a two-page, fiery red spread in a
trade magazine. The legend reads, "75,000 people at over 200 locations
around the world are applying advanced technology to electronics, space,
defense, automotive, aircraft, and selected commercial and industrial
markets." The message, in bold-faced type: "Snarled freeways. Foul, air.
Polluted water. Crime in the streets. Soaring medical costs. Overcrowded,
understaffed hospitals. Solving top priority national problems is a
(company's name) specialty. For over a decade, our balanced blen.d3 6 of
systems engineering services and technological skills have been used on
America's space and defense programs. Now we are successfully applying
35 "Convertibility of Space and Defense Resources to Civilian Needs:
A Search for New Employment Potentials," bearings by Subcommittee on
Employment and Manpower of Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, U.S.
Senate, 88th Congress, Second Session, 1964.
John S. Gilmore and Dean C. Coddington, "Diversification Guides for
Defense Firms," Harvard Business Review, Vol. 44, No. 3, May-June, 11166,
pp. 144-16o.
360ne might note, parenthetically, that "balanced blend" is highly
favored phraseology in advertising circles, and applied indiscriminately
to tobacco and coffee as well.
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this experience to a variety of Civil Systems problems."
The heavy emphasis on the commitment to social service always appears
in this kind of advertisement. Anxious to create an image reflecting the
public good and demonstrating social responsiveness, companies deeply
enga(,ed. in the development of fighter bombers, missiles, and rockets wish
to convey the impression that their prime focus is benevolent. Their
advertising message is the red herring; drawing attention away from the
fact that the ratio between their civil and defense-space contracts is
that of gnat to elephant! Public protestation of their social usefulness
also appears in the companies' notices of employment opportunities.
Apparently eager to counteract reluctance on the part of the present
generation of college graduates to enter the business world, they use the
lure of the challenging career in the service of mankind and imply that
this is their raison d'titre, too!
Conspicuous among the contenders for contracts are the nation's
"think tanks," organizations whose business it has become to solve other
people's problems. A number of thenc are, like the aerospace industry,
seeking new outlets for their talents, especially with the removal of
Robert S. McNamara from his post as Defense Secretary. Snowing disenchant-
.went with his research policies, a likely major item for contention in
the Presidential campaign of 1968, will probably affect the flow of funds
from the Department of Defense to the research organizations created,
encouraged, or sustained by it.
A series of articles in the New York Times 37 describing the think
9
	 tanks stressed their similarity to the condottieri of medieval Italy.
"Where the latter offered skilled soldiers for hire to the highest bidder,
37Richard. Reeves, "U.S. Think Tanks," New York Times, June 12., 13,
14,, 15, and 16, 1967.
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the think tanks have intellectuals for rent," states the editorial on the
subject. "In return for appropriate payment from the clients, these
research institutions are prepared to perform tasks as diverse as planning
the most efficient use of the Strategic Air Command, inventing new break-
fast cereals, or funding improved methods to combat criminals. 'Their
rapid-growth and the high salaries they offer are impressive evidence of
their success." 38 For many of the 100 such organizations now engaged in
this almost $ 2-billion-per-year business, the RAND Corporation (its name
a contraction of the words research and development and its original mis-
sion that of research arm of the U.S. Air Force), has served as the modea.
.1ndeed, two of them, System Development Corporation and Analytic Services,
Inc., are direct offshoots, while many others are founded by its entre-
preneurial "graduates." RAND and these others are now actively competing
for contracts in the civil sphere.
A review of the reasons underlying the California experience would
not be complete without reference to the social and cultural climate in
which it took place. We are in what has been variously called a Scientific
Age or Technological Era. If one is willing to subscribe to the notion
that systems analysis is a form of technological "spinoff," then the ele-
ment of utilization of some of the fruits of the tremendous expenditures
for research and, development in aerospace and defense becomes pertinent.
Whatever can be distilled out of the giant military and space investment
as useful and rationalized as worthwhile for the benefit of the public
and as leverage in Congress has received lavish coverage in the press;
systems analysis has been touted as one such contribution. A less con-
scious, but nonetheless dynamic, force in this situation is the dictum
f^
38New York Times editorial, June 17, 1967.
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put forward by Ralph B. Lapp, viz. that "technological possibilities are
irresistible to man. 1139 Possessed with their own imperative, they will
be put to use. Systems analysis, as a technique in search of an applica-
tion, was readily adopted, in the California case, because of the appeal
of "revolutionary new concepts"40 for addressing persistent social, problems,
Impatient with traditional approaches as program planning and manage-
ment in public administration become ever more compl.ex, 1+1 we eagerly seek
new tools and techniques. Social problems fester, and new ones emerge as
technological and scientific advancer confront us daily with new challenges.
Air, water, and land pollution proceeds at an awesome pace; crime rates
soar; arteries and facilities for ground and air traffic are dangerously
burdened. Apprehensive over increasing disenchantment with established
practices, public officials have been attracted by the idea of a.: fresh
look by a different kind of experts, who, ideally, would be unfettered
by the doctrinaire restraints of the professionals associated with the
subject. Not insignificant in the chcije of the methodology of systems
analysis and its practitioners was the element of magic derived from their
relationship with dramatic and spectacular space ventures. This halo
effect has been exploited to its fullest as the practitioners of the magic
turn their talents from missiles and rockets to mass transportation and
city planning.
39Ralph E. Lapp, The New Priesthood, New York: Harper and Row,
Publishers, 1965, p. 67.
40Cf . , Pigou on "cheap toys."
4lFor the reader who wishes to acquaint himself further with the
Literature on this subject, the U.S. Bureau of the Budget has prepared
a comprehensive bibliography U.S. Bureau of the Budget Library, Program
Analysis Techniques: A Selected Bibliography (Revised), Washington, D.C.,
1966, and Supplement, 1967. Also cf., S. B. Chase,, ed., Problems in
Public Expenditure Analysis, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,
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Evident in the California experiment were the very factors identified
by John hrunner l42 in his penetrating scrutiny of "the new enlightenment"
dominating Britain's public planning policies. "One sees at work the same
very human motivations, the same craving for certainty and the resolution
of conflict, the same gn1libility in face of those who claim to know the
answers." But, he asks, have we merely substituted one set of symbols
for another? is our present deference to a new set of experts who think
they can identify '"the public interest" with a technique and a computer
""so very different from the deference of the ancient Creeks to the priests
and acolytes who interpreted the word of the oracles. . .?"
The new idolatry differs from the ancient order by virtue of its
strongly "scientific" flavor. This, of course, permeates the systems
approach because of its origins and enhances its acceptance as a nostrum
for social ills. The ostentatious use of figures and formulas conveys
an impression of mathematical precision. but the impression may or may
not be valid. E. S. Quad+e has suggested that fancy mathematical, techniques
are sometimes used as window dressing or "actually to disguise poor
analysis."" 43 Further, he has warned that analysts whose basic orientation
is mathematical are inclined to '"focus on the mechanics of computation
or on the technical relationships in the model rather than on the important
questions raised in the study."" 44 A similar caveat regarding overdependence
on quantification comes from John Brunner, ". . . great delight in express-
ing trends and influences in the fora of figures tends to introduce a
42John Brunner, "The New Idolatry" in Rebirth of Britain, London:
Pan Books, I.td., in association with the Institute of Economic Affairs,
1964, P. 33.
43E.
 S. Ruade, op. cit., pp. 246-247.
44E. S. Ruade, off". cit. , 'p. 309.
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subtle bias in favor of the measurables at the expense of the often cru.-
cial intangibles. r115 This tendency evidently has created some difficulty
in defense planning, for, in the development of a more sophisticated
semi-quantitative method for its long-range decision-making, the U.E. Air
Force has tried to devise means to curtail "systematic malingering,"" or
"the application of excessive quantitative values to parochial technolog-
ical interests." 46 Based on the judgment of technological, operational,
and systems experts, and not on strictly measurable factors, TORQUE
(Technology-Research Quantitative Utility Evaluation) will test the feasi-
bility of providing ranked quantitative values to projected security needs
of the United States ten years hence.
The place of mathematics in modeling, cost/effectiveness, and systems
analysis receives serious consideration here because it is both an impor-
tant selling point and a stumbling block in the way of proper evaluation
of a completed study. Uninitiated persons, predisposed to regard "mathe-
matical precision" as a term that brooks no internal division, accept it
without question. Impressed with the infallibility of figures and formulas
and understandably indisposed to reveal ignorance by challenging mathemat-
ically derived solutions, many a public administrator, for example, has
found himself acting out a new role in the age-old drama of "'The Emperor's
New Clothes." Particularly unassaila'hle are techniques and solutions
which harness the powers of the computer. Most lay persons, unacquainted
with higher forms of mathematics, are unable to understand their applica-
tions, let alone distinguish between what is valid and what is not. But
w
	 when a computer has turned out the calculations, the average citizen is
45john Brunner, op. cit., p. 38.
4 6Walter Andrews, "AF to Try Systems Analysis on Exploratory Develop-
ment," Aerospace Techne;loM, April 8, 1968, p. 18.
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cowed and dumb. Among the cognoscenti, GIGO used to be the acronym for
Garbage In, Garbage Out. That it now stands for Garbage In, Gospel out
is a commentary on public acceptance attitudes.
Political. Considerations
With no pejorative intent, it must be noted that political coitaidera-
ti 	 rtermeated, influenced, and even dominated the Gtate of California's
experience. They are certain to play a like role in all government-
industry ventures of this type and, therefore, deserve attention. Mere,
it might be well to explain, we refer not only to partisan politics but
also to what Aaron Wildaysky has called 2olig politicss related to the
selection of policy to be adopted., and system politics, which have to do
with decision-making structures .•+7
From the point of view of simple party politics, the very notion of
invokinC space magic to solve terrestrial problems apparently ? ,zas great
appeal. A content analysis, somewhat superficial but indicative, of the
newspaper coverage of the four contracts indicates that the aerospace
studies yielded substantial political mileage in the form of both industry
support and voter appeal, in an election year. Democratic and Republican
contenders for office continue to promise the electorate that they will
harness this "powerful tool of technology" to solve the whole array , of
complex social problems. Thus, systems analysis provides a vehicle,
possibly in the form of a bandwagon, on which many ride, on county back
roads and on the high road to Congress. The leverage is derived from
'the novelty, the promise of "scientific" solutions, and the quest for
innovation in solving earthly problems; in other words, the hitching of
the stars to our wagons!
47Aaron Wildaysky, op. cit., P. 304.
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The trend toward problem-solution by systems analysis is growing
rapidly, largely because of the peculiar political benefits that may
accrue to the client. The object lesson to be drawn from the California
experience is that regardless of their intrinsic worth, systems studies
can be a handy political tool, in the application of which there may be
both protection and advantage. To be more explicit, the government
agency or organization that takes the initiative in instituting an analy-
sis is in much safer position with respect to its authority and its per-
ceived objectives than the one subjected to such study by an outside
agency or superior level. If the affected agency can participate to the
extent of monitoring the study, this will strongly influence the bounds,
the variables, and the selection of program alternatives and objectives.
The results are likely to be considerably more palatable than those
superimposed from outside or above. If, in the process of the study,
the client's conception of his organizational raison d°etre is substant ­
ated or enhanced by the system study, he may use this as "sc.tentific"
justification to pursue the course of his choice. If, on the other hand,
he finds the results distasteful, he, as "customer," can exercise the
option to ignore them. In the final analysis, it is the "customer" who
must live with the recommendations of the outside experts. In his own
hands, and not those of some level higher up, the completed study can
either be implemented or classified under the heading of State Secret.
In common with the findings of such bodies as special committees and
study commissions, 48
 results of systems studies frequently elude meaning-
ful communication. The latter oaten take the form of such banal
48For a perceptive and satiric view on "The Commission on Commission-
Watching" and its rise, procedure, and report-preparation, see Elizabeth
B. Drew, "On Giving Oneself a Hotfoot: Government by Commission," The
Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 221, No. 4, May, 1968, pp. 45-50.
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generalities as "people are the greatest potential resource in society,"
platitudes expressed in "dynamic programming models" designed to impress
but not illuminate, commonplaces couched in jargon, and reams of unex-
plained fold-outs and undigested computer print-outs, provided as evidence
of work busily if not necessarily done. One might safely assert that,
because of what appears to be consciously contrived obfuscation, systems
analyses are their own best protection against critical public scrutiny.
Additional protection comes from the political milieu. Once com-
pleted, the study becomes the property of the government. Criticism of
it impugns the judgment of the officials who advocated it and allocated
the contract. The whole affair, therefore, becomes a politically sensi-
tive matter. Consequently, quite irrespective of its evaluation by expert
practitioners and professionals inside or outside government, the study
is accepted with criticism silenced or ignored. Bureaucratic or official
inertia have also been seen to impede careful review. The technical
monitor of a study by the Hudson Institute is reported49 to have advised
the Comptroller General that although his opinion of a study was unfavor-
able, he had approved it "because the report had already been paid for
and one of OCD's (Office of Civil Defense) research personnel who had
reviewed the report had commented favorably on it. The others had not
conmented at all. "
The technique of systems analysis has great promise as a politically
useful levice for a number of reasons: (1) It legitimizes governmental
,..
tions on the Administration by the Office of Civil Defense of Research
Study Contracts Awarded to Hudson Institute, Inc., Report B-133209, March
25, 1968, Appendix 11, p. 6.
planning by divorcing it from historical stigmata and defusing it of
""socialistic" connotations. (2) It enables the public official to examine
49Flmex B. Staats, Comptroller General of the United States, Observa-
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questions ,implicit in many problems but likely to have been avoided in
the political And bureaucratic context. (3) It can be applied, for accom-
plishing definite ends, as a strategic weapon either to Justify or shake
up the bureaucratic status ao_• On the way goals and performance measures
have been set depends the kind of case made for maintaining or abandoning
the existing organizational power structure. "Scientific" corroboration
can be supplied for attacking a problem not only across traditional bur-
eaus and divisions but also outside ,jurisdictional boundaries and units.
For example, the Waste Management Study 50 recommended a total approach
to all wastes -- gaseous, liquid-borne, solid, and radiological.. At
present, pollution of each constituent of the environment is handled as
a separate problem and by a multiplicity of agencies. The Study also pro-
posed a central, statewide authority for the unified direction, coordina-
tion, and control of the activities . of the lesser units, such as counties
and cities. Similarly, the Information Study 5l called for both functional
and j urisdicti.^­a re-alignments, in the name of improved operation and
supported by "rational," "logical" arguments. In this gray, the system
analysis can neutralize highly charged political matters and, perhaps,
even remove there from the arena of public debate. Used in this fashion,
systems analysis becomes an extremely useful tool for the strengthening
of a particular ideology. It helps rationalize a position, bypasses the
checks and balances that safeguard the democratic process, and centralizes
a	 50California Waste Management Study, Aerojet-General Corporation, 1965.
51ccllifornio Statewide Information System Study, Lockheed Missiles
& apace Company, July 30, 1965.
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control, - all in the name of "efficiency. "52
It should be noted here that recommendations, no mutter how logical
or rational, to abolish archaic or anachronistic political. entities, are
likely to be carried out only if they are consistent with the prevailing
ideoloiy. Since governmental. agencies die hard and such bodies of vested
interests as cities and counties guard against usurpation of -their baili-
wicks, they cannot be ignored in the design and operation of a system.
A frequent criticism leveled at the California studies and at others which
have followed is their political naivete and impracticality of implemen-
tation.53
Contradictory to the extravagant claims of its applicability and
paradoxical in view of its widespread acceptance as the way to solve man-
kind's problems, limited usefulness appears to be a common characteristic
of systems analyses in the public sector! In his recent report to Con-
gress, 514
 Elmer H. ataats, Comptroller General of the United States, took
the unprecedented step of criticizing publicly the systems studies per-
formed for a public agency by an outside contractor and emphasized the
fact that the results were of little va:like. His observations related to
three research study contracts, totalling some $ 600,000, between the
Office of Civil Defense (Department of the Army) and the Hudson Institute,
52Senator Henry M. Jackson at Hearings on Planning-Programming-
Budgeting before the Subcommittee on relational Security and International
Operations of the Committee on Government Iperations, U.S. Senate, 90th
Congress, First Session. Part 1, August 23, 1967: "The fellow who con-
trols the system can mmiipulate it and almost rig it. In add" ?cion, I
observe, he can ignore other beliefs about technological chan,Ses, con-
flicting appraisals of costs and ben-Fits, and so forth."
53Gilmore, et al., op. cit., p. 43.
5141;1mer B. Staats, opt.
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Inc., a well-known "think tank" headed by Berman Kahn. 55 Seven of the
11 reports submitted by Hudson were rated as "less useful than had been
expected or required major revision before OCD would accept them. ,, 5 6 A
responsible Civil, Defense official advised the Comptroller General that
three of the reports were limited to distribution within the Office of
Civil 'Defense, general, dissemination having been withheld because "the
reports wero lackin i, in depth or sufficient value to warrant the loading
of bookshelves." 57
Limited, indeed, is the usefulness of any study the main conclusions
of which are neither a refinement nor an improvement of the state-of-the-
art of public planning prior to the analytic treatment by experts. The
recently completed California Regional Land Use Information System,58
representing a $ 220,000 expenditure, is a case in point. The following
are the principal conclusions verbatim and in Coto:
There is Heavy traffic in the exchange of land-related date..
Significant ben°fits are possible from the solution of identified
data problems.
Data users are aware of the needs and are highly cooperative,
A statewide: land data system should be implemented.
`!.'he index and additional key functions should be centralized.
Data collection, storage, and retr:ival should remain the
responsibility of the cognizant c- ganizations within the
individual data centers.
An operating statewide system is possible in :five years, with par-
tial services available in three years.
5511erman Kahn, formerly associated with the RAND Corporation, best
known for the following books: On Thermonuclear War, Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1960; Thinking about the Unthinkable, New York:
Horizon Press, 1962; The Year 2000, A Framework for speculation on the
Next Thirty-Three Years, New York: The Macmillan Company,- 1:96'(:
56Rlmer B. Ctaats, o12. cit. , pV:" -8:-'
57Loc. cit .
58TRW Systems Group, California Regional Land ;1se Information S sy tem,
Redondo Beach, California, 1968. A major part of the funds for this study
cwi.e from d federal grant under the Urban Planning :Assistance Program.
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Five--year development and operational costs will be $ 2.9 million.
Net savings of $ 1.6 million over costs are estimated for the
same period.
The development and operational effort should be under the direc-
tion of an interorgani.zational Policy and Plans Group.
These platitudes and generalizations, '"packaged" elegantly in what resem-
bled closely in form and content a company advertising; brochure, were
supposed to help the public planner because they were somehow derived from
554 questionnaires which yielded 35,000 records and about 10 million
characters.
If the application of systems techniques to civil problems continues
to yield "solutions" of such doubtful utility, there may be reason to
develop the hypothesis that the systems study conducted by experts in the
technique may be useful simply as a mechanism for the graceful nonsolution
of problems! This would certainly put it in the class of institutionalized
do-nothing devices like the Blue ribbon Committees, task forces, and com-
missions, especially with respect to the use suggested by Elizabeth B.
Drew, 59 "To postpone action, yet to be ,justified in insisting that you
are at work on the problem."
If in viewing critically the growing trend toward referring sticky
public problems to neat and orderly treatment by cost /benefit or systems
analysis, one assumes that some responsible official or agency wants a
particular problem to be solved, one may have to acknowledge one's own
political naivete. The traditional escape-hatch through which officials
can avoid the accusation of procrastination and inaction has now taken
on prestigious trappings. If the administration has called upon scientists
and experts to solve the problems of poor housing, crime, unemployment,
education, and welfare, then voters can hardly accuse it of doing nothing!
59Elizabeth B. Drew, op. cit.
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Critical Analysis of the TechnigLue 2 the Technicians, and the Experiment	 A
The inclusion of systems analysts in the realm of public affairs
implies certain assimptions about the nature of social problems and cer-
tain presumptions about the state-of-the-art of systems techniques.
Underlying the State of California's and all other similar endeavors,
whether local, national, or international, is tb-^ , assumption that large-
scale, complex social systems can be "managed" in much the same way and
by the same kind of experts as large-scale, complex aerospace projects
and military missions. This implies that social systems car, be reduced
to measurable, controllable units all of whose relationships are fully
recognJzed, appreciated, and amenable to manipulation. Implicit, too,
is the notion that through systems analysis, new insights will be achieved
and new solutions will emerge. justification for this line of thought
appears to 'be vested In the persuasion that experts from outside the dis-
cipline or the public agency will bring to the probleirt a fresh look,
unfettered by doctrinaire restraints.
In actual practice, none of these assumptions found subst tint i ation.
Iieview of systems analyses completed indicates that far from submittlntr
g,racefully 'to quantitative treatment,, social systems are by their very
nature so laden with intangible, human variables that concentration on
their measurable aspects distorts the problem and confuses the issues.
One raight venture the proposition that instead of assuming that social
systems shou.Ld be approached as though readily subject to technical treat-
ment, those which appear technical inight more appropriately be treated
W	 as social in their essence. Concerns which are largely technological,
when they irapinge on our social, economic, and political environments,
require a social orientation. Thus, transportation is not mere movement
of people and goods nor miles of highways and location of airports.
.N
Qk
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bather, at stake here are the values of the society -_ how many acres of
recreation.. :land it is willing to forfeit to rie-ht,s-of-way, whethor it is
willing to accept some mode of travel other than the one-man, one--car,
vlio.le priori.tiets- should be taken into account in asneusi.n,p beiiefit r of
trtitisport f'cj.ci li.t.ic S ? C0 A transportation system deoit r nod to enhance the
life ;tyle of a society would have 'to be based on some utopian conception
of the good life and would :incorporate many of the anal,yot's own value
judgments. Reflected in such a .system, there would have to be assumptions
about people's preferences for location of home, form: of travel., means
ot" recreation, use of leisure time. Also, account would have to be taken
of their tolerance of land and air traffic noise, sonic booms, and the
like; their concern for highway and air safety; their interest in curbing;
pollution. Crucial even in so technical a matter as planninpr a trans-
portation network are the social costs and benefits, and these are out-
side the purlieu of quantification and beyond the proper lima. t.s of
manipulation .
In the Waste Management Study,0 the problem was not simply one of
disposal of unwanted products. A total waste management system is a complex
network of technical interrelationships and critical aesthetic, geographical,
economic, political, Jurisdictional, and administrative considerations.
Here, criteria, standards, and regulations of environmental quality are
crucial. With the skies not spacious enough for all the debris and the
seas not deep enough to swallow the fissionable wastes of this nuclear age,
it is readily apparent that the design of the system would have to take
60
G H.`Peters, Cost-Benefit Analysis, London, institute of Economic Affairs,
Eaton Paper 8, 1996 9
 p. 23.
bl o
 . cit.
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into account a broad range of value laden uncertainties running the gamut
from people's choice of fuels to their way of dealing with international
tensions.
Similarly fraught with deep social significance are the aggregation
and organization of da ta, superficially innocuous operations vital to the
systems approach. Because business and government managers have allowed
themselves to believe that computer technology will provide information
systems that will expedite and improve policy-planning and decision-making,
systems experts have responded by replacing the overflowing files with busy-
working computers. On the assumption that all information is relevant unless
proved otherwise and that economies of scale supersede all other considera-
tions, the engineers in all of the cases observed recorded every possible
Item and j ustified this by the spectacular lowering  of unit cost 	 1,. the
Welfare Study^ 2 for example,.the proposed system was designed to yield
not only the routine facts about age, marital status, and the like but
would also respond to spec'i'al inquiries. it could tabulate the number of
welfare cases in which the unemployed father was a migrant laborer, with a
bad cardiac condition, with two years of schooling and little English. And,
like the sorcerer's apprentice, it ^I,ould keep on pouring out information,
--that the area in which the family lived had x number of substandard dwell-
ings, v number of jobless bricklayers, and was z miles from the nearest
police station. This cornucopia failed, however, to supply government
planners with the indicators they had sought in identifying populations-at-
risk and intervention strategies for anticipating dependency on public
welfare. Guided by the principle of the more information the better,
42.
analysts currently engaged in a California Criminal Justice information
Study, under a $350,000, largely federally-funded contract with Lockheed
Missiles & Space Company, have made the discovery that their proposed in-
formation network calls for the same items of intelligence about potential
Jurors as criminals;
The reification and deification of data which dominate the systems
approach could well be one of its most serious hazards to a democratic
society. The manned California systems are only a small link in a national
chain capabl( of providing an instant check on any American with complete
details on his birth, color, religious and political affiliations, club
memberships, school performance, military record, criminal career, credit
rating, and medical history. Even if a man's past contained nothing so
damaging as a mental illness or a criminal connection, he could be tabbed
by the system as a potential member of some designated "risk" population,
such for example as criminal or welfare, and as such become the object of
unwelcome official attention. Recent historical events in this country
and abroad provide little reassurance of long-lasting benevolent intent
on the part of all future administrations and under all possible situations
of duress,	 war, witch hunts, and so on.
The testimony of experts in the Congressional Hearings on "The Com-
puter and Invasion of Privacy0 '63 presented substantial evidence that it
is naive and fatuous to reply on technological locks. One computer expert
from the RAND Corporation 
64
cautioned against accepting statements that
ring seductively of safety when, in f.rict, a computer can generate its own
63 Hearingsof the Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations,
U. S. House of Representatives, 89th Congress, Second Session, July 26,
27, 28, 1966.
64 PaulBaran, Testimony at 'The Computer and invasion of Privacy,' op. cit.,
pp. 119 ff.
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cryptographic key.
observes one soclologist, "The ;;potential for evil, for official and
unofficial blackmail, for the harassment of political minorities is virtual-
ly unlimited. One must realize that whatever safeguards may be proposed
in the initial ,justification could later be removed by a powerful president
or a stampeded Congress. Also, the safeguards probably would be circum-
\ented on or off the record by our undercover agencies. 1 '65 Alan Westin,
In a definitive work entitled Privac and Freedom, 66 made the cogent
observation that while tyranny is not the necessary outl,ome of the new
uses of information technology, "tyranny can be tighter and more inclusive
for more people, and more efficient and more inescapable with the contribu-
tion of computers and data processors."
Recognizing the threat of cradle-to-grave surveillance, Thomas A.
Cowan commented, rr . ., it is a prime policy matter to determine what data
shall be preserved, and among those that are preserved, which it is politic
In any instance to suffer to be recalled. Data-retrieval experts make the
blithe assumption that data are, ipso facto, good." 67 His recommendation
for "creative unlearning" or purposeful forgetting comes from his experience
in the practice and philosophy of law and is all the more apropos in view
of the potential dangers to; individual privacy inherent ii. the capability
for the electronic matching and coordination of large masses of information.
Experts have observed that until now, privacy has been protected by the
65 H. Taylor Buckner, letter to the Editor, The American Soci ologist,
Vol. 2, No. 1, February, 1967, p. 25.
66 AlanF. Westin, Privacy and Freedom, New York, Atheneum, 1967, p. 300.
67Thomas A. Cowan, "Decision Theory in Law, Science, and Technology,'
Scli-nce, Vol. 140, June 7, 1963, P. 1070.
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Inefficiency of the government to manipulate the great amounts of data it
has already.	 But complete and detailed dossiers area no longer an
Orwellian fantasy nor a post-1984 nightmare.. It has taken a special de-
cision of Co,:qt ess to halt (at least; temporarily) the establishment of a
Federal Data Center, ,justified by its contribution to government erFlelency
but insensitiv(: to individual, private Interests, and feared as a form of
Frankenstein monster. 68 During the testimony before a Committee on the
Judiciary, four witnesses quoted the famous and prophetic statement of
c
Justice Brandeis in a Supreme Court case in 1927.69
The makers of the Constitution 40060 recognized the significance of
man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect .. They
sought to protect Americans In their beliefs, their O',oughts, their
emotions, and their sensations. They conferred as against the Govern-
ment, the right to be let alone -- the most comprehensive of rights
and the most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every
unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon privacy of the individual.,
whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
The implications of advancing information technology in social
planning, where: responsibility for determining what information shall be
gathered and how it shall be used is a vital element:, are extremely gravy
because of the trained incapacity of the systems analyst. Lacking the
theoretical framework on which to draw, he has a different conception of
data from that of the professional in the given field and approaches them
as an inanimate entity, an "input," to be programmed and manipulated for
the efficient functioning of a system. The analysts doing the Crime Study,
for example, accepted as their data base the current statistics on convicted
68 SenatorEdward V. Long, at Hearings on Computer Privacy, Subcommittee
on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the Judici-
ary, U. S. Senate, 90th Congress, First Session, March 14 and 15, 1967,
P. 1
69 Olmsteadv. U. S. 277 U. S. 438, 478 (1927).
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offenders and built all their assumptions and conclusions on ehese figures.
Reliance on the precise quantification of these imprecise and unreliable
W
data led them to an emphasis on r:rime-susceptible individuals, and away
from crime-making conditions. This approach inevitably encouraged'a neo
Lombroso taxomony of offender characteristics. If applied, the conclusions
of the , study would have resulted In a "system of criminal justice , ' which
would have embodied a disastrous attack on the human liberty of the least
protected sectors of the population!
The handling of a system's information system cannot be divorced
from its theoretical and operational framework, its objectives and its
raison d'etre. Data collected, collated, and manipulated without sensi-
tivity to their meaning, their relationships, and their appropriateness
are not only dangerous for us as individuals but also a menace to society,
for they can impede the offorts of social planners to achieve an under-
standing of social problems in their true and dynamic dimensions, The
appropriate model, the significaiFL frame of reference, sensitivity to the
meaning of the subject matter - these are essential to systematic analysis;
and they are totally lacking In the technological approach to information.
t	 There is a real possibility that through the misinterpretation, in-
appropriate weighting, or distortion by Procrustean treatment to force
complex problems into analytically tractable shape, important questions
will be ignored and unfortunate conclusions reached. The dangers to so-
ciety are compounded when political expedience, inertia, or inexperience
with quantitative techniques discourage critical evaluation of a system
which satisfies only "technical" requirements.
Sir Isaiah Berlin, 
70 in his admirable critique of eighteenth century
70
Isaiah Berlin, "History and Theory: The Concept of Scientific History,"
History and Theory, Vol 1, No. 1, 1960, p. 17.
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mechanists, lists certain prerequisites for adequate model construction;
the sense of what is characteristic and representative, of what is
a true sample suitable for being generalized, and, ab^)ve all, of how
the generalizations fit in with each other -- that is the exercise of
judgment, a qualitative, quasi-intuitive form of thinking dependent
on wide experience, memory, imagination, on the sense of "reality,"
of what goes with what, which may need control by, but is not at all
identical with, the capacity for logical reasoning and the construc-
tion of laws and scientific models -- the capacity for perceiving the
relations of tie
	
case to law, instance to general rule,
theorems to axioms, not of parts to wholes or fragments to completed
patterns.
The zeal of hardware merchants and software peddlers to sell their wares
has made information a valuablo commodity, to be bought and sold. This
intertwining of technology and Madison Avenue 7l could eventually remove
Information-handling, the heart of most government operations, from the
very professionals who understand best the purposes and uses of the data.
Such persons are more likely to recognize that data represent human lives,
the men and women and children for whom the system should function optimally,
even if this means putting them outside its bounds or terminating its opera-
tions. The Welfare System, for example, might better be understood by
inquiring into ci°6er systems, such as education, employment, public health,
or transportation. Arid since the social benefits of all these interlocking
systems elude quantification, there is no reason to believe that they can
be assessed with all their external effects by persons expert in technique
but deficient in substantive kn-owledge.72
Lack of appropriate professional orientation is equally apparent in
proposed total systems designs when ignorance is mistaken for objectivity
71
Madison Avenue is used here as the symbol of public relations and adver-
tising.,
72
Substantial documentation on the concept of externalities as special
cost/benefit the-iry applied in pub l ic policy matters is to be found in
the study, G. H. Peters, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Public Expenditure,
London, The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1966.
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and analysts do not know when they are retreading worn ruts or rehashing
tired hypotheses. This has occurred often but has only recently been
t
brought to public attention. In their report to the Office of Civil Defense
on "Management requirements for Crisis Civil Defense Programs," the Hudson
Institute was quoted as saying, "The goal of this report is to show the
importance of peacetime preparations for the management of crisis programs.'173
The official evaluation by a technical monitor was that the report was super-
ficial and provided no new information to the professionals in the field;
moreover, he commented, the goal as set forth by Hudson had long been
achieved. Absence of guiding principles caused analysts in the California
Welfare Study74 to base their conclusions on a severely limited and not too
closely related sample. On the basis of about 110 cases, they projected a
possible target population of some 400,000 families and then declared that
the evolving patterns that they discerned were 'logical and consistent."
Their prediction techniques, based on their own econometric model, reflected
more their own bias about welfare recipients than a knowledge of the field.
Concentration on economic factors, to the exclusion of social and behavioral
influences, provided a set of formulas which suggested a chance coincidence
between the actual and the predicted in the short run but in the long run
generated discrepancies that demanded the introduction of other variables
as explanation. The prediction results were found to be substantially less
accurate than those reached by the professional research staff as part of
their routine duties and without the'powerful tools of technology."
I.
	
However, far from seeking the	 of profess Iona Is In the
4.
	 particular field, technical experts s,trxrti tt) 1^ , ^oe deve l oped techniques for
73
Eimer B.
74 
op. cit.
Staats .  Report to the Congress, op. cit., pp. 32, 33.
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systematic avoidance of such involvement. " progress reports" provided
little information on which to evaluate progress and were almost invariably
9
submitted so late that it was practically impossible to effect changes.
For example, in the Office of Civil Defense's dealings with the Hudson
Institute, 
75 
the first report on contract 64 -116 was submitted about seven
months after the contractor had begun and when two-thirds of the research
work had been completed. Underthe second contract, the first report
appeared five months after the inception of the project and with three-
quarters of the estimated work done. In the California Welfare Study,
"progress reports" which were supposed to ensure the active participatUl
of the State Social Welfare Board and other members of a resource committee
reached them on the very day of the scheduled meeting and sometimes right
at the conference table. Resentment of criticism from the professionals
in the field typifies the attitude of many technical systems experts. It
may take the mild form of intolerance;; it may, however, carry a contemptuous
message which says "You falled to solve this mess by your methods so stand
aside while I straighten it out with mine!"
Conclusion
Systems analysis as a tool in social planning cannot be assessed in
isolation from (1) the particular technicians using it, (2) the salesman-
ship permeating it, (3) the political environment surrounding it. There
seems to be no way to distinguish the state-of-the-art from the state-of-the-
artist, nor from the self-j , stifying and -perpetuating mechanisms that "sell"
N
the methodology quite irrespective of its appropriateness and usefulness in
1	 a given situation, nor from the circumstances that encourage its prolifera-
tion but discourage its improvement.
75 ElmerB,, Staats, Report to the Congress, o
	 cit., p. 17.
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In the absence of objective standards by which to rate the systems
design or study, there can be no ,judgment of good or bad. instead, one
4
finds apologistic "interpretations" on the part of the proponents, especially
I	 the technical community, and opportunistic, albeit selective, 'utilization"
on the part of ambitious bureaucrats. The former are prone to enunciate
modest disclaimers that "systems analysis is no panacea, but ... . 11 Eyeing
bigger contracts, they continue to promise total systems in the future and
to deliver sub -optimized modules. The latter, recognizing the possible
value of the system analysis for strengthening or defending an ideological
position or as basis for a power play, reflect the current trend toward
"scientific" rationalization for decision-making.
The prevailing mixture of salesmanship and politics dominates all
applications of systems analysis in public affairs, practically guarantees
repetition at the same level of technical sophistication, and may, if
allowed to go unchallenged, preclude socially meaningful advances in the
state-of-the art. Only through chpnnels of inquiry for discussion and
evaluation free from public relations embellishments and blandishments can
there develop the methodological and conceptual mutations needed in order
to create a tool useful in social planning.
Because of the growing inclination to regard systems analysis as
the fount of intellectual technology which will improve policy planning
and decision making in the public sector, it is important to review some
of the lessons that administrators should have derived from the California
and other similar experiences. Above all else, they must either learn to
clarify their objectives and conceptualize their problems or abdicate: this
vital responsibility to others, who may be less familiar with and under-
standably less committed to their goals. There is an impor-tant role in
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the process of social accounting and planning to be played by professional
persons, whether in the employ of government, industry, universities, or
elsewhere. In every systems study, the close and constant involvement of
individuals expert In the relevant disciplines is absolutely essential.
S
Since human and social values are at stake and must be safeguarded as old
problem areas are subjected to new modes of treatment, there must be built
into the process the active participation of competent behavioral scientists.
Unfortunately, this requirement may offend the group's conception of itself
and its role, for, in their zeal to safeguard methodological chastity, 76
its members have shown a predilection for a high level of abstraction and
a great propensity for theory-construction. There is, despite all the
hazards involved therein, an urgent need for the responsible condvct, hand-
ling, and reporting of live research so that models of social systems will
be adequate representations of the reality situation and not the sketchy
distortions produced by inappropriate experts.
y
Foremost among the contributions of the California experience has
been the rediscovery of the basically multi-faceted nature of every major
problem facing the government planner. This certainly indicates a clearcut
need for knowledge on many fronts and involving many kinds of capabilities.
o	 Economic, political, and social rationality all must contribute to develop-
ing a viable model. Highly desirable, indeed, would be a creative synthesis
achieved through a genuine multi-disciplined effort directed to'Linderstand-
ing the complex problems of our society. It is interesting to speculate
the extent to which systems analysis will be the vehicle to and the end
product of such a synthesis.
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This point is well made by E. J. Mishan, The Costs of Economic Growth,
London, Staples Press, 1967, P. xvii.
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